

Message Text

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FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: END OF ROUND XI PRESS CONFERENCES

1. EASTERN AND WESTERN END OF ROUND PRESS CONFERENCES WERE HELD FOLLOWING 134TH PLENARY SESSION.

2. THROUGH OBVIOUSLY PLANTED QUESTION POSED BY TASS REPORTER IN BOTH CONFERENCES, THE EAST REVEALED ITS PROPOSALS TO TABLE NATIONAL SUB-TOTALS AND INDICATED WEST HAD REJECTED PROPOSAL. (SEE PARA 6, QUESTION (2) BELOW EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE; AND PARA 5, QUESTION (9), WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE.)

3. WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE BY NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS LASTED
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FORTY MINUTES INVOLVING 14 QUESTIONS AND WAS ATTENDED BY 20 CORRESPONDENTS FROM EAST AND WEST. IN ADDITION TO QUESTION BY TASS CORRESPONDENT REVEALING EASTERN PROPOSAL RE NATIONAL TOTALS, EASTERN CORRESPONDENTS (IZVESTIA AND BULGARIAN NEWS AGENCY) POSED QUESTIONS ON WESTERN RESPONSE TO EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSALS, AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS. WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS POSED GENERAL

QUESTIONS REGARDING LINKAGE WITH SALT AND "CHIEF STUMBLING BLOCK TO PROGRESS".

4. EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE OPENED WITH DETAILED SUMMARY OF TARASOV PLENARY STATEMENT BY SOVIET SPOKESMAN (PARA 7 BELOW) AND READING OF EASTERN END OF ROUND PRESS STATEMENT (SEE MBFR VIENNA 0194). APART FROM TASS QUESTION RE NATIONAL TOTALS, EASTERN CONFERENCE WAS SLUGGISH AND INVOLVED ONLY SIX QUESTIONS.

5. TEXT AND Q'S AND A'S WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE BY NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS:

(1) Q. (AFP) WHEN YOU SAY THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES IN THE AREA, DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE IS NO SUCH A DISCREPANCY ON WESTERN FIGURES?

A. IN GENERAL TERMS, THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH OUR FIGURES, BUT THEY HAVE NOT SPECIFIED TO US WHAT REALLY ARE THE EXTENT AND THE NATURE OF THEIR DISSATISFACTION SO FAR.

(2) Q. (IZVESTIA) MR AMBASSADOR, HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT YOUR FIGURES ARE MORE ACCURATE THAN THOSE OF THE EAST, AND ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU COUNT THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES?

A. OUR COMPUTATIONS OF EASTERN FORCES ARE BASED ON ALL OF THE INFORMATION THAT WE HAVE AND WE THINK THEY ARE ACCURATE ESTIMATES.

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(3) Q. (CBS) WHAT LEADS YOU TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE MORE PROGRESS IN THE NEXT ROUND IF NOTHING HAS HAPPENED IN THE PREVIOUS ELEVEN ROUNDS?

A. FIRST OF ALL, I THINK THAT WE MUST REMAIN OPTIMISTIC. I DON'T KNOW IF THERE WILL BE PROGRESS IN THE NEXT ROUND. WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE PROGRESS, OF COURSE, AND WE FEEL THAT WE HAVE LAID THE BASIS FOR PROGRESS BY THE REALISTIC AND REASONABLE PROPOSALS THAT WE MADE.

(4) Q. (CBS) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS SOME PROGRESS MADE IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS THAT IT WILL HAVE A GOOD INFLUENCE ON THESE TALKS? DO YOU THINK IT IS CONTINGENT UPON UPON THESE TALKS, THE PROGRESS MADE?

A. IT WOULD BE BEYOND MY COMPETENCE HERE, AS THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE NATO MBFR DELEGATIONS TO GO INTO AN APPRECIATION OF THE SALT TALKS. I THINK THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE, IF YOU READ WHAT IT IS PUBLISHED ON THIS MATTER TO MAKE AN APPRECIATION

OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE PROSPECTS THERE ARE. BUT,
ANYWAY, WE THINK THAT THERE IS NO ORGANIC NOR DIRECT LINKAGE
BETWEEN THESE TWO NEGOTIATIONS. THEY BOTH OF COURSE DEAL WITH
THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT BUT SEPARATE SECTORS OF IT. AND WE ON
OUR SIDE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE ON
THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN MERITS. WE HAVE MADE ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE
CONTRIBUTIONS, WE FEEL, TO PROGRESS HERE. AS FAR AS WE KNOW
FROM THE OTHER SIDE -- AS FAR AS THEIR STATEMENTS GO -- THEY
DON'T PLACE ANY LINK EITHER IN THE SENSE THAT A SOLUTION IN ONE
SECTOR WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED INDEPENDENT OF THE OTHER. OF COURSE,
THERE IS A GENERAL, MUTUAL LINK BETWEEN THESE TWO EXERCISES IN
SO FAR AS SUCCESS AND PROGRESS AND ONE COULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL
INFLUENCE ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF
VIEW OF THE OTHER. AS I SAID BEFORE AND WOULD LIKE TO STRESS
AGAIN, WE DON'T SEE ANY REASON HERE FROM OUR SIDE TO MAKE ANY
LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO; WE ARE READY TO MOVE AHEAD HERE, AND
WE HAVE DOCUMENTED THAT BY OUR CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS.
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FROM US REP MBFR

(5) Q. (NBC HOFFER) ON THE DISPARITIES: COULD YOU GIVE US A PERCENTAGE FIGURE:

A. I AM SORRY, BUT UNDER THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY I WOULD PREFER NOT TO GO INTO SPECIFIC FIGURES AT THIS MOMENT.

(6) Q. (HOFFER) PERCENTAGE? -- 20 PERCENT OR?

A. I RATHER NOT GO INTO THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE. THE DISCREPANCIES ARE CONSIDERABLE.

(7) Q. (WILKOVA - BULGARIAN NEWS) ON PAGE NO. 2 YOU ARE SPEAKING OF THE SUPERIORITY OF THE EAST. YOU SAY: THE EAST ALSO HAS SUPERIORITY IN TANKS AND MAJOR ARMAMENTS. DOES THE TERM "MAJOR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ARMAMENTS" INCLUDE NUCLEAR ONES?

A. WELL, THE NUCLEAR COMPUTATION IS A VERY COMPLICATED ONE. I AM THINKING NOT ONLY OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS WHEN I AM SAYING THIS, BUT ALSO OF OTHER MAJOR CATEGORIES, LIKE AIRCRAFT, LIKE ARTILLERY, LIKE SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILES, ALL CATEGORIES IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO OUR BEST INFORMATION THE EAST HAS CONSIDERABLE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES. OF COURSE, THE NUCLEAR COMPUTATION IS A VERY COMPLICATED ONE. YOU HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHEN YOU REALLY LOOK AT NUCLEARS, YOU CANNOT FORGET THE VAST NUCLEAR ARSENAL WHICH IS ON THE TERRITORY IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA, IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS TARGETED ON WESTERN EUROPE, I.E., TARGETED ON THE REDUCTION AREA.

(8) Q. (BULGARIAN NEWS) A SECOND QUESTION. THERE IS NOTHING IN YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT THIS PROPOSITION OF THE EASTERN SIDE CONCERNING THE FREEZE DURING THE TALKS.

A. NO, BUT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO INTO THAT. BOTH SIDES, AS A MATTER OF FACT, HAVE PROPOSED NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS, AS WE CALL IT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE WEST WAS THE FIRST TO DO SO, IN 1974. THE BASIC DIFFERENCE LIES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH BOTH SIDES FEEL THAT SUCH COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO. IT IS OUR POSITON -- THIS IS THE FIRST POINT -- THAT WE ARE NOT HERE TO NEGOTIATE A FREEZE, BUT, AS THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED IN 1973 AT THE END OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS DEFINED IT. WE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES, SO WE WOULD NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD TAKE AWAY THE FOCUS FROM THIS

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE. IT IS OUR PROPOSAL THAT A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO IN CONNECTION WITH A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT, A FREEZE IN ISOLATION WHICH WOULD BE CONCLUDED PRIOR TO A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD MERELY CONTRACTUALIZE THE EXISTING FORCE DISPARITIES WHICH FAVOR THE EAST TO SUCH A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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LARGE EXTENT. IT WOULD THUS CLEARLY UNDERMINE THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REDUCTION PROCESS TOWARDS PARITY.

THEREFORE, AS A SECOND POINT, WE FEEL THAT A FREEZE SHOULD BE IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AS THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD CONTAIN A PRIOR COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES TO ENTER INTO REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN OUTCOME OF PARITY, AND WHICH WOULD ALSO IN THIS FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, IN THE FORM OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS, AND MAKE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT CONCEPT. THE THIRD POINT IS THAT, TO BE WORKABLE A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT MUST BE BASED ON CONCRETE FACTS. IT WOULD HAVE TO DEFINE WHAT WE ARE ACTUALLY FREEZING -- WHAT IS THE LEVEL AT WHICH WE ARE NOT GOING TO INCREASE. ON THIS POINT, AS WE HAVE JUST MENTIONED BEFORE, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST ON THE FORCE LEVELS EXISTING AT THE MOMENT, ON THE MANPOWER LEVELS ON THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. AS LONG AS WE DON'T HAVE AGREEMENT ON THAT, ON CERTAIN CONCRETE FACTS, A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD AT BEST BECOME A LASTING SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONTENTION, IT WOULD THUS ENTAIL THE RISK OF UNDERMINING STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE RATHER THAN ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY AS WE ARE SUPPOSED TO DO HERE. THAT WAS THE THIRD POINT. THE FOURTH POINT IS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT, THE WESTERN SIDE, ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FORCE LIMITATIONS. SO THESE ARE SOME OF THE POINTS WHY WE THINK ON OUR SIDE WHY THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, AS IT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD, IS NOT FEASIBLE. IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US.

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FROM US REP MBFR

(9) Q. (TASSAMASLOV) WHY DID THE WEST REFUSE TO GIVE FOR THE
DISCUSSION THE NATIONAL DATA OF THE MANPOWER GROUND FORCES
ON THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. WE HAVE NOT REFUSED ANYTHING, WE HAVE NOT PRECLUDED ANYTHING.
I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO. COULD YOU ELUCIDATE
A LITTLE BIT MORE ON YOUR QUESTION?

Q. (SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION - TASS-MASLOV) WHY THE WESTERN SIDE
REFUSES TO DECLARE THE NATIONAL DATA OF EACH NATIONAL FORCES -
ARMED FORCES?

A. WE HAVE NOT REFUSED ANYTHING, AS I SAID BEFORE. YOU ARE NOW
GOING INTO THE QUESTIONS OF METHODS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION
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AND, AS I SAID BEFORE, I WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THIS AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE UNDER THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE. SINCE WE ARE SO WIDE
APART. WE HAVE AGREED TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE AND I THINK
BOTH SIDES WANT TO STICK TO IT. WE WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO EXPLORE
THIS SOMEWHAT MORE IN AS QUIET AND PRIVATE AN ATMOSPHERE AS
MUCH AS POSSIBLE. BUT AS FAR AS YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION IS
CONCERNED, I CAN ONLY SAY WE HAVE NEVER REFUSED OR PRECLUDED
ANYTHING. WE HAVE PROPOSED AS A FIRST LOGICAL STEP TO DISCUSS
SOVIET AND US NATIONAL DATA AND THAT IS WHERE WE STAND AT THIS

MOMENT.

(10) Q. (TASS-MASLOV) DO YOU THINK THAT THE GOALS OF THE NEGOTIATORS MUST FIND SOME COMPROMISES TO MAKE APPROACHES IN THE VARIOUS POSITIONS? WHAT KIND OF COMPROMISES WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE?

A. WE HAVE PROVIDED A VERY PRACTICAL, REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE WITH THE PROPOSALS WE MADE IN DECEMBER 1975. THAT IS ONE YEAR AND A HALF AGO NOW AND WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR THE EAST TO DEMONSTRATE ITS READINESS TO COMPROMISE, TO MOVE FORWARD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO DOCUMENT THEIR VERBAL DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST BY CONCRETE DEEDS, THAT IS BY PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THOSE PROPOSALS.

Q. (SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION -TASS-MASLOV) SO, IF I UNDERSTOOD YOU CORRECTLY, YOU SEE THE COMPROMISE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF YOUR PROPOSALS?

A. WE MADE IN DECEMBER 1975 A VERY LARGE STEP, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE AS REGARDS THE INCLUSION OF AIR ELEMENTS AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. OUR ORIGINAL POSITION WAS THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON ESTABLISHING PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. WE STILL FEEL THAT THIS IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION -- THE IMBALANCE IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THAT FIELD, THE LARGE EASTERN SUPERIORITIES IN MANPOWER AND IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS. TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE BY THE EAST OF THE BASIC TO THE WESTERN APPROACH, WE MADE THESE IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCERNS AND SHOWED THE WAY TO RECONCILING THE TWO BASIC REDUCTION APPROACHES AND PROVIDED, WE FEEL, A REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. BUT WE ARE STILL WAITING, AS WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR QUITE A WHILE ALREADY, FOR THE ADEQUATE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THOSE PROPOSALS.

(11) Q. (IZVESTIA - PEREVOSCHIKOV) WHEN YOU SAY, WITH REGARD TO BASIC REALITIES (UNCLEAR) MORE GROUND FORCES AND THOSE OF THE WEST, (PARAPHRASE - THE STRIKING FORCES OF BOTH SIDES CONSIST NOT ONLY OF GROUND FORCES BUT ALSO FROM AIR FORCE AND OTHER ARMAMENTS...? (UNCLEAR)

A. AS I SAID BEFORE, WE HAVE CENTERED OUR NEGOTIATING APPROACH ON WHAT WE THINK IS THE CRUCIAL, OUTSTANDING FEATURE OF THE SECURITY BALANCE IN THE REDUCTION AREA: THAT IS THE LARGE GROUND FORCES DISPARITIES FAVORING THE EAST AND THE IMBALANCES THERE AND THE RISKS SUCH IMBALANCES POTENTIALLY

ENTAIL FOR STABILITY. WE HAVE SINCE GONE A LONG STEP TOWARDS
MEETING EASTERN CONCERNS AS REGARDS AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR
ARMAMENTS, AS I JUST EXPLAINED, IN OUR DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS.
BUT WHEN WE LOOK AT THE PICTURE AS REGARDS AIR FORCES,
THERE ARE MORE BASIC REALITIES. ONE BASIC REALITY
IS THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION, WHERE LRGE AIR FORCES
AND LARGE NUCLEAR FORCES ARE SITUATED WHICH WOULD
BE OUTSIDE ANY AGREEMENT, THESE ARE NOT COVERED BY
THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AS OF THIS MOMENT AS THEY ARE NOT
CONDUCTED. THAT IS QUITE A BASIC REALITY --- THE
UNLIMITED, NUCLEAR POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
WHICH IS TARGETED ON WESTERN EUROPE AND WHICH WILL
NOT BE LIMITED BY ANY ARMAMENTS NEGOTIATIONS GOING
ON AT THIS MOMENT.

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FROM US REP MBFR

Q. (SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION - IZVESTIA - PEREVOSCHIKOV)
(PARAPHRASE) - YOU CONCENTRATE ON THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET
TANKS. ONLY YESTERDAY, WESTERN PAPERS REPOTED THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAD DEVELOPED TANK KILLER AIRCRAFT AND AT THE SAME
TIME YOU REFUSED TO REDUCE AIR FORCES.

A. TECHNOLOGY ALWAYS DEVELOPS. WE THINK OUR PROPOSALS AS OF TODAY AND THE PRESENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY AS IT IS APPLIED IN THE MILITARY ARSENALS AND OPERATIONAL ARSENALS OF THE TWO SIDES, OUR PROPOSALS ARE STILL REASONABLE, EQUITABLE AND PRACTICABLE.

(12) Q. (CBS - REED) IF YOU WERE TO SINGLE OUT ONE BASIC FACT THAT IS THE CHIEF STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE PROGRESS OF THESE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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TALKS, WHAT WOULD YOU SAY IT WOULD BE?

A. IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, I WOULD SAY THAT THE CHIEF STUMBLING BLOCK IS, WHERE AS WE ON OUR SIDE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL MOVES SINCE NOVEMBER 1973, SINCE WE MADE OUR FIRST PROPOSALS, WE HAVE ADDED TO THEM IN VARIOUS WAYS, ESPECIALLY IN OUR DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS, AND WE HAD ALREADY BEFORE ADDED TO THAT CERTAIN ASPECTS TO THAT WE MADE VERY IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS THE EASTERN SIDE HAS NOT BUDGED AT ALL FROM ITS STARTING POSITION. THE EAST CONSTANTLY TRIES TO EXPLAIN TO US THAT THE PROPOSAL THAT THEY MADE IN FEBRUARY 1976 ARE SORT OF A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL BUT, WHEREAS WE SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED OUR ORIGINAL POSITION BY ADDING IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY TO THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WHICH THE WEST WOULD UNDERTAKE WITHOUT ASKING FOR ANYTHING IN RETURN FROM THE EAST. IN THIS EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 19, 1976 ALL BASIC FEATURES OF THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE APPROACH OF PERCENTAGE WISE REDUCTIONS, THAT IS ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS AND THAT WOULD MEAN FREEZING IMPORTANT FORCE DISPARITIES WHICH FAVOR THE EAST, AND PLACING THE WEST IN A PERMANENT POSITION OF INFERIORITY NOT ONLY AS REGARDS MANPOWER, BUT ALSO AS REGARDS MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND OTHER TYPES OF MAJOR ARMAMENTS WHICH I HAVE ENUMERATED BEFORE. AND THE WEST WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL CEILINGS. NATIONAL CEILINGS, AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO THEM, ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US BECAUSE THEY WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND WOULD PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE. MOREOVER, THEY MIGHT MAKE IT FOR THE WEST IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN ITS FORCE LEVELS AT THE OVERALL LEVELS AT WHICH THEY WOULD BE AGREED IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. ALL THAT IS, OF COURSE, IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC BECAUSE WE WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH CONDITIONS WHICH CLEARLY DIMINISH OUR SECURITY, AND WHICH CLEARLY PROVIDE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST. THIS UNREALISTIC EASTERN POSITION IS WHAT I THINK YOU CAN CALL THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK AT THIS MOMENT.

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(13) Q. (AFP -BOCEV) COULD YOU SUM UP AMBASSADOR RESOR'S INTERVENTION, OR TELL US IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW?

A. IT WAS THE USUAL END-OF-ROUND SUMMING UP OF OUR POSITION AND YOU WILL FIND MANY OF THE ELEMENTS REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENT THAT I READ TO YOU.

(4) Q. (CBS - REED) HOW LONG WILL THE RECESS BE?

A. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME THE WEEK OF MAY THE 9TH.

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FROM US REP MBFR

6. TRANSCRIPT OF Q'S AND A'S - EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE
BY CZECH REP MEISNER:

(1) Q. (AFP) (DELIVERED IN ENGLISH)

HOW COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHEN YOU SAY THAT THE DATA SUBMITTED BY THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES SHOW THAT THERE IS AN APPROXIMATE

PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO BLOCKS? AS AGAIN AMBASSADOR DE VOS TOLD US ABOUT THE CONSIDERABLE DESCREPANCY.

A. WELL, THE FIGURES SUBMITTED BY BOTH SIDES STATED ON THE APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM. I DO NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO THIS, AS IT IS A CONFIDENTIAL MATTER. THE WESTERN VIEW IS THAT THERE IS SOME SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE AND WE ARE NOW DISCUSSING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THIS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN VIEW AND OUR VIEW. BUT ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW THE DATA WHICH HAS BEEN TABLED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROVED THAT THEY SPEAK OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN BOTH SIDES. IN THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THE MANPOWER.

(2) Q. (TASS) (DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN)

COULD COMRADE MEISNER PLEASE GIVE SOME MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES REFUSE TO SUBMIT OR TO DISCUSS NATIONAL, AND I EMPHASIZE NATIONAL FIGURES CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I SAY REMEMBER THERE POSES A QUESTION TO THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR DE VOS THAT IT IS UP TO THEM TO RESPOND WHY THEY DO SO. WE SUPPOSE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL ALSO TO DISCARD THE NATIONAL FIGURES, BECAUSE WE SUPPOSE THAT THE OVERALL FIGURES ARE THE SUM OF THE NATIONAL FIGURES. WE PROPOSE THIS AND WE WILL SEE HOW IT WILL CONTINUE.

(3) Q. (AFP) (DELIVERED IN ENGLISH)

BUT DID YOU SUBMIT NATIONAL FIGURES ON THE STRENGTH OF YOUR SIDE?

A. WE PROPOSE TO SUBMIT THEM. WE DIDN'T DO SO BECAUSE THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE THAT THEY WILL DO IT. WE ARE READY TO DO SO. NOT YET THOUGH.

(4) Q. (CBS) (DELIVERED IN ENGLISH)

HOW MANY MORE YEARS THEY EXPECT THESE TALKS TO GO ON?

A. WHO KNOWS. I AM NOT REALLY A PROPHET, AND ESPECIALLY ON THAT ONE. I HOPE NOT A LONG TIME, BUT WHO KNOWS?

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(5) A.

ARE YOU AN OPTIMIST?

A. I AM OPTIMISTIC. I HOPE THAT THE DETENTE THAT IS DEEPENING HERE WILL ALSO WORK SOMEHOW IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO COME TO SOME CONCRETE AGREEMENT.

(6) (AFP) (DELIVERED IN ENGLISH)

DID YOU SEE ON YOUR SIDE ANY KIND OF GENERAL LINK BETWEEN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SALT TALKS?

A. OUR TALKS ARE SEPARATE TALKS. THERE ARE ALSO THE MILITARY TALKS BETWEEN 11 OR 19 PARTICIPANTS. SALT IS MILITARY PROGRESS. EVERYTHING OF COURSE IN THE POLITICAL WORLD IS LINKED WITH EVERYTHING, BUT NEVERTHELESS, OUR TALKS ARE SEPARATE TALKS ON THE MILITARY BASIS, CONCERNING THE SPECIAL PART OF EUROPE. SO, I THINK IT IS A SEPARATE UNDERTAKING.

7. SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT SUMMARY READ BY SOVIET SPOKESMAN AT OPENING OF EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE:

TODAY THERE TOOK PLACE THE 134TH PLENARY MEETING WHICH WAS THE FINAL ONE OF THE CURRENT ROUND. IN THE CHAIR WAS THE HEAD OF DELEGATION OF THE USA, AMBASSADOR RESOR. STATEMENTS WERE MADE AT THE MEETING BY THE HEADS OF THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR TARASOV, AND THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMBASSADOR RESOR.

IN HIS STATEMENT, AMBASSADOR TARASOV NOTED THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE OFFICIAL FIGURES CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED HAD REAFFIRMED THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS IN CENTRAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EUROPE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES OF THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS, INCLUDING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES. ON THIS BASIS THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS CAN AND MUST BE RESOLVED ONLY ON THE SOLE JUST BASIS WHICH IS, THROUGH EQUAL PERCENTAGES IN REDUCTIONS FOR ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WESTERN SIDE CONTINUES TO REFUSE THIS PRINCIPLE, TO REJECT THIS PRINCIPLE, AND CONTINUES STUBBORNLY TO INSIST ON ITS OWN ENTIRELY UNWARRANTED ASSERTION CONCERNING DISPARITIES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT SUBMITTED, AND OF COURSE, COULD NOT HAVE SUBMITTED ANY PROOFS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF ITS

ESTIMATES WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.
THE CONTINUING DISCUSSION OF THE POINTS OF PRINCIPLE CONCERNING
THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS, LIKEWISE, HAS NOT YET LED TO

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01
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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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PERCEPTIBLE RESULTS. THE WEST CONTINUES TO AVOID GIVING A
REPLY TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE
19TH OF FEBRUARY, 1976. DESPITE THE AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET
UNION TO UNDERTAKE TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES REDUCTION
OF ITS FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
AND CANADA STUBBORNLY REFUSE TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS REGARDING
THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES WHICH, AS
IS KNOWN, REPRESENTS 3/4 OF THE TOTAL COMBAT POTENTIAL OF NATO
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THEY INSIST ON THE
INSTITUTION FOR THEMSELVES OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH WOULD
ALLOW THE MILITARILY IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE BLOCK FURTHER
TO BUILD UP THEIR MILITARY POTENTIAL OVER THE PRESENT LEVELS.

THE REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN STATES TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL
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OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR A NON-INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIMULTANEOUS BUILD UP OF MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH IS BEING CONDUCTED ON A BROAD SCALE AT THE PRESENT TIME TESTIFIES TO THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WEST SERIOUSLY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND DETENTE IN THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE. MEANWHILE, IT IS CLEAR, AS WAS STRESSED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, LEONID BREZHNEV, THAT FROM THE ADOPTION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL "NO ONE WILL LOSE, WHEREAS THE CAUSE OF PEACE, THE CAUSE OF SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES CAN ONLY GAIN". IN CONCLUSION, AMBASSADOR TARASOV CALLED UPON THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ONCE AGAIN TO REVIEW THEIR POSITION FROM THE STAND POINT OF REALISM AND A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH WITH A VIEW TO MAKING THE NECESSARY CORRECTIONS IN IT. CORRECTIONS CORRESPONDING TO A JOINT ADVANCE TOWARDS PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

RESOR

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